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\$101.70, printing, \$9, supplies, \$5, rebates, \$56 (\$42.50 to The New York Classical Club, \$13.50 to the Pittsburgh Classical Club), Liberty Loan Bonds, \$300, Beck Duplicator supplies, \$11.50, conferences in connection with the Proposed American Classical League, \$92.54, travelling expenses, \$19.45, telephones and telegrams, \$2.57, refund of duplicate payment of dues, \$2, a total of \$1653.31. The balance in the current cash account, on March 29, 1919, was \$78.21. In addition to this the Association has \$388.63 in the Savings Bank, and the sum of \$300 invested in Liberty Loan Bonds. The total assets of the Association are thus \$766.84.

On April 27, 1918, the balance to the credit of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY, current account, was \$605.84. The receipts during the year, from all sources, were \$2056.25. The total in the funds was thus \$2662.09. The expenditures of all sorts were \$2478.61. The balance in the current account, March 29, 1919, was \$183.48. To this must be added the sum of \$584.41, in the Savings Bank, and the further sum of \$500, invested in Liberty Loan Bonds. The total assets of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY are thus \$1267.89.

During the year the sum of \$252.83 was sent to the University of Chicago Press, to cover 126 subscriptions to The Classical Journal, Volume 14, and 57 subscriptions to Classical Philology, Volume 14.

The Great War made itself felt in a loss of members in the Association, and in a loss of subscribers to THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY outside the territory covered by the Association itself. The membership fell from 681 to 582, and the subscription list fell from 704 to 542.

It was reported last year that rising costs had caused the increase in subscription price of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY to \$2.00. This, of course, had its effect in diminishing the number of subscribers, though the income of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY as a whole profited. No one can obtain THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY now without making an outlay of \$2.00. Such a system of absolute equality is sound at once in business and in morals.

Taking into account the conditions set up by the Great War, and recalling what we know of the experiences of periodicals in general, we may regard the showing for 1918-1919 as one in no sense discouraging. It may be noted that no special effort was made last year to proselyte for members or subscribers. By next fall conditions, let us hope, will move so far toward normal that efforts in this direction may be made with fair prospect of success. It should be remarked that the total income of THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY from members and subscribers both in 1917-1918 was \$1779.20, in 1918-1919 \$1664.60.

It will be seen that, in 1918-1919, the subscriptions to The Classical Journal fell from 161 to 126 and those to Classical Philology from 67 to 57, losses of 35 (22%) and 10 (15%) respectively. These losses occurred in spite of very vigorous efforts to keep the subscription lists intact.

The total cost of the pamphlet, The Practical Value of Latin, printing (15,000 copies) and postage, to March 29, 1919, was \$280.75; the amount received from sales of the pamphlet was \$310.90. There was thus an apparent profit of \$30.15. From this must be deducted, however, (unknown) postage costs, in mailing copies to purchasers, that were not kept separately until two years ago. The cost of 5,000 copies of Professor Cooper's paper was \$30.77. The sum received from sales, to March 29, 1919, was \$48.90. The apparent profit was thus \$18.13. Over against this lie unknown postage costs; they have not at any time been kept separately.

C. K.

THE CLASSICS AND THE PROFESSORS OF EDUCATION

I

An apology is due the reader for a new entrant upon this jousting place which has so scintillated recently with Launcelots and Parsifals. It is that the newcomer bears as his emblem a small white flag: he would fain be a peacemaker.

A long time ago everybody believed in 'faculty' psychology. About 1892, with a suddenness that was quite a shock to some of themselves, the psychologists¹ discovered that the faculties of the mind are non-existent, quite like the substances of the Scholastic realists. The unpardonable misdemeanor of the classicists is that they cling to this discarded tenet. Ask one hundred teachers of the Classics to distinguish between 'faculty' and 'functional' psychology, and ninety will modestly decline. They are fighting none the less!

But the classicists ought to know the difference. It is annoying in the midst of serious *apologiae* to find the most eminent of them doffing their helmets in this wise: "capacity for voluntary effort and attention" (1918)²; "training in ability to handle one's mind" (1917); "some trained faculty of appreciation" (1917); "develop the logical and historical faculty" (1911); "discipline the intelligence and the other faculties" (1910); "trains the reasoning power and general intelligence" (1914); "trains the dialectic faculties and the rhetorical faculties" (1911); "the faculty of independent reflection" (1916); "power of generalization" (1911); "we believe absolutely that power is transferable" (1917); "when this power to use and control the mind is once thoroughly attained, the boy or girl can learn anything" (1917); "the faculty of error can be atrophied like any other human faculty, . . . and the best way to inhibit error is to create by constant practice an instinct <sic> for correctness" (1912).

Now of course no one would deny that some persons are able to give attention, to use their minds after a fashion, even to think logically, etc. The point is that these things should be thought of, and spoken of, not as powers, but rather as habits. To permit oneself to dwell upon powers of the mind involves a treacherous tendency to assume a unification of mental processes which may not exist. Instead of basing all sorts of conclusions and conduct upon an assumed unity, we must begin by demonstrating the unity.

How can the mind be trained? We may disregard those psychologists who seem to wish to say that it can not be trained at all. Professor Shorey has disposed effectually of them: "If you are a competent psychologist, you know that it is false". Perhaps it would be better to quote the words of an empirical

¹Apologies to the Herbartians.

²The numbers indicate the years of publication of the articles from which the quotations are made.

psychologist (Rugg, *The Experimental Determination of Mental Discipline in School Studies* [1916], 116)³: The writer believes that formal school subjects find a large part of their disciplinary value in the developing of this ability to analyse a problem and to organize a method of procedure; to build up ideals, or to organize a method of attack. But it is undoubted that they also make habitual or automatic many specific constituents of the complex abilities that function in many complex situations. The habitualizing of these specific reactions is accentuated by the building up of a background of fundamental attitudes of orientation, or familiarity with the content of the situations to be met.

The misunderstanding has centered in the word 'formal'. This does not mean systematic or organized, as sometimes has been assumed.⁴ It means a training which can find application in a field of activities different from that wherein it was received⁵. The accepted terminology now is *transfer of training*. 'Common-sense' used to make some rather extravagant claims for transfer: "It does not matter upon what the mind is exercised, provided only the exercise be vigorous and long-continued" (1901); "As any form of exercise will develop some muscles. . . , so any kind of study properly pursued will develop the muscles of the mind" (1917). In reaction to this a few psychologists were disposed to deny utterly the possibility of any transfer. But in the last ten years so many experimental data upon the matter have been accumulated that there is no longer any disagreement about the fact. The questions that remain are how, under what circumstances, and to what degree does transfer take place. Perhaps the best non-technical discussion of this whole question is in the chapter entitled *Generalized Experience*, in Professor Judd's *Psychology of High-School Subjects* (1915)⁶.

There has been a side-show over the word 'discipline'. Assuming that it means something else than training or development, many persons have leapt to the conclusion that indispensable elements therein are compulsion and unpleasantness (the explanation of this phenomenon, it has been suggested, is to be found in pre-medieval theology). Professor Dewey's analysis of the process of rational thinking⁷, which unquestionably has carried us a long step in advance, opens a vista of the truth in this controversy, at least in the higher intellectual activities. Perhaps it will not be unfair to summarize thus the conclusions of his mono-

graph, *Interest and Effort in Education*: interest and effort are not opposed, but identical—there can be little or no fruitful effort where there is no interest, just as one can not increase the inner growth of a tree by jerking, pulling, or stretching; and real interest of itself brings forth effort. Therefore, if the purpose of your instruction be mental training, either arouse the pupil's spontaneous interest in the study or quit before you begin. However, to allay the fear that difficulties are to be an inhibition of either interest or effort, we may quote from a recent editorial in the *Journal of Educational Psychology*:

One of the chief values of educational procedure is the demand it makes of the pupil to concentrate all his intellectual resources and *master* the difficulties that he encounters.

In other words, one must be trained to maintain, or even to increase, interest and effort in the face of difficulties.

The next onslaught upon the classical stronghold came from educational sociology. There was a time when one hundred per cent. of the pupils in the Secondary Schools contemplated continuance of their schooling to or nearly into adult life, followed by the practice of a means of livelihood which depended upon intellectual activities; and had, presumably, a mental equipment which justified them in that endeavor. But all those things have changed. When the overwhelming numbers came in of those who were going forth this year and next to manual pursuits, did the classicists at once set to work to devise means of distinguishing between those who would profit by their ministrations and those who could not? Did they quickly become aware that there must be a radical change in the methods and the content of their work, if they were to be offered at all to the newcomers? The professors of education tried to tell them of these necessities; but the only answer that one can recall is: 'We have been doing these things a thousand years. Do you suppose we are going to change now?'

Let us now take the professors of education to our bosoms as helpmates and friends. Let us admit that until ten years ago there was no science of education, only a conglomerate of rules of practice and personal opinions; it is an inchoate science now, it is reaching upward into the Secondary and Higher Schools, and we need its help. Let us admit that until very recently psychology was entirely speculative and introspective; it is empirical now, it has learned to temper enthusiasm over novelties, and it has much to teach us. Let us forgive those, from Professor Thorndike⁸ down, who claimed transfer of training for their several hobbies in the same moment wherein they were most rabid against us for the plea that we had seen mental growth not in the laboratory, but in real life. All that is changed now. Let us forgive and

³This book contains an excellent summary of the experimental data to date on the transfer of training.

⁴Compare the volume edited by Professor West, *Value of the Classics* (Princeton, 1917), 20.

⁵It relates, therefore, to the 'form' or 'fixity' of the mental process, as distinguished from the 'reality' or 'variableness' of the object-material; and is not concerned with the organization of the latter.

⁶See also page 213, in the chapter entitled *Foreign Languages*. The reader may be referred also to Colvin, *The Learning Process* (1911), 242, 246: "The possibility of a general training is thus seemingly established both in theory and in fact, and it becomes the business of education to consider how such a training can best be secured. . . . Other studies which are not now so well developed will, perhaps, some day take the place of mathematics, or natural science, or the classics and modern language, but to-day they are less valuable from a disciplinary standpoint".

⁷*How We Think* (1910).

⁸Compare *Theory of Mental and Social Measurements* (1904), 4.

forget those who through ignorance or perversity, like Doctor Flexner and sundry others, adhere to the discarded tenets or prejudices of a decade and a half ago, even as we ask oblivion for the many, many of our friends who have said and done unsupportable things. Let us forget that many professors of education are pusillanimous; so are the most of us, and of the rest of the world. If they are uninformed of any truth that we possess, the fault is not theirs; it is because we have not demonstrated this truth to them in language that carried conviction.

Henceforth let us speak of these persons as the 'analysts'. And, since we always have believed in the value of analysis, let us cease at once complacently to stand pat repeating the formulae which mean so much to us but nothing to any one else, until some one knocks us prostrate. If we really love the ideals of our classical study more than ourselves, let us begin under the tutelage of our friends to make an analysis of the conditions and details of our work, so that what is not easy of comprehension in the gross may be lifted item by item out of the realm of dispute. Possibly as we proceed some trimming of our own vines may seem timely.

II

Habit or habituation is the process of mental growth. We must make long lists of the most specific habits—for example, recognition of accusatives in *m*, or of aoristic tenses. Thence we must build them up in loftier and loftier hierarchies—such as the sensing of the objective relation in all sentences, consciousness of the antithesis of subject and object in varied nuances, etc. From time to time we should test individual pupils as to whether these hypothetical generalized habits really function. It may be difficult to classify some specific habits under any categories that we wish to recognize—for instance, the habit of distinguishing between consonant and *i* stems in the third Latin declension: then it should occur to us to balance the value of such a habit against the time required to form it.

It would take too long here to propose any list even of the upper hierarchies. They range all the way from 'power of expression' (and of understanding) through the rational processes to habitual affective (emotional) attitudes toward complex human situations. Some of them are shared with other School subjects; some are peculiar to linguistic study.

Analysis of the mental processes is by no means sufficient. Where does knowledge come in? Knowledge is the content or instrument by means of which the higher mental habits are evolved. From what has been said it is evident that the mental habits are given shape in very large degree by the specific knowledge in which they find their development. The aspect of knowledge, therefore, is two-fold: (1) it is of direct practical value in some subsequent activity, (2) it determines mental habits. Putting out of

consideration research work in the Graduate School, we should have difficulty in demonstrating that any knowledge is gained through the dead languages, and only through them, which is of direct practical value, except those facts of the languages themselves which have survived in the modern tongues. Our analysis and catalogue of the knowledge imparted in our courses, accordingly, must specify for each item direct practical value, if any—how is it a factor in determining desirable habits, how do these values balance against the time required for acquisition?

Knowledge itself is habituation. Acquisition of knowledge is habitual association of something new with a tendency already in the mind, making a new response-complex (apperception). It is habit on the lowest mental plane. Our catalogue of the items of knowledge, therefore, will hardly differ from the list of specific habits. It is the starting-point.

The writer is aware that classical teachers are now are quite disgusted with this paper. But there is another side to the content which will hearten them. It is the function of literature to present human situations under conditions closely akin to those in which the laboratory endeavors to reproduce phenomena of the natural sciences; obstructive factors are eliminated, contributing elements are 'controlled', the central fact is put under the microscope or otherwise exaggerated. Thus one learns to see what familiarity teaches him as a rule to overlook in the daily life about him. Literature presents it so that he will adopt an attitude toward the phenomenon; he will love it or hate it—this in addition to recognizing it henceforth in his environment and seeing in it a causal explanation of other familiar elements of life. Phenomena take on a different aspect when transposed; foreign literature effects this transposition of human conduct to another field—we call the product breadth of view. In social life, as in biology, complexity is always increasing; ancient literature, life, and history are set in relatively simple conditions, where comprehension is easier and the untangling of modern life more sure—this is genetic insight. If the young biologist is to be impressed by the structural relation of birds and reptiles, first he studies these types separately. There may be a long interval—many years—between his study of forms and his succumbing to the significance of their relation. So in School life one may get only the points of orientation from which will develop the thoughts and the emotional attitudes of his adult years; in some respects he may do no more than learn how to get a point of orientation at a later date. But, like noxious bacilli, elements of human character develop rapidly when once they get a foothold.

How are we to analyze these content values? In the first place, we must differentiate keenly between those which defy approach otherwise than through the ancient tongues and those which truly are accessible through translations and modern treatises. All the latter we

must look upon unequivocally as by-products of a study which we justify upon other grounds. Secondly, we must make sure in some way that the attitudes, points of orientation, recognition of identical characters, etc., really get over, that we do not expose a sensitive plate to the dark by neglecting to operate the shutter. Having taken these precautions, we must begin with items of knowledge or information, just as outlined above, and build up hierarchies of habits through associations and attitudes, until we arrive at elements of character which seem to have rather general and worth-while application. Here as there we should look askance at any item that does not rank itself easily under a higher category. By the process we may find new enlightenment upon the controversy of intensive vs. extensive reading.

Probably there will not soon be unanimity in regard to which of these two purposes of classical study deserve prime consideration—linguistic and intellectual habits, or idealistic attitudes and breadth of view. Professor Judd has put himself on record for the former⁹:

When the advantages of teaching foreign language are formulated by teachers of language, this argument for a clear understanding of the structure of the vernacular will doubtless survive as one of the most important reasons for teaching foreign languages.

Those of us who have dug deeply into the spirit of Latin and Greek literature perhaps will favor the other as having the greater intrinsic worth for the destiny of the race, though pertinent to a much smaller portion of our pupils. The problem is not the same for all times or all ages. We must balance the more immediate and practical values to the many who start on the road and progress only a little way against the far-reaching influence of the few whose characters are profoundly moulded by these studies. Above all we must put ourselves in a position to be able to measure both, as to attainment, with reasonable accuracy.

This brings us to the last demand upon us of the new science of education: we must analyze the human material, the educands. Too long have we acted upon the assumption that what is good for one is good for all. Let us ungrudgingly admit that some ought never to begin this study—perhaps ten per cent., perhaps fifty, perhaps ninety per cent.—who knows? Let us set ourselves to invent a means to distinguish which are sheep and which are goats. Let us cease for all time to defeat the higher purposes of our profession by assuming a hereditary title and patent right to force our wares upon persons who lack the native capacity to make use of them. This is not a problem to be settled on the principles of a political band wagon. We can afford to be proud of numbers only when we are able to demonstrate that so great a portion of the population is profiting individually and collectively

in proportion with the time they give us, and when they go forth from our halls with unanimous enthusiasm.

These analyses can not be made by an individual teacher. The task would be too great; they would inevitably be lop-sided and incomplete; they would fall short of a standing that would make them authoritative. They must be made by Classical Associations. Once made, they will point uncompromisingly to the truth. All persons concerned—including the public, to whom we owe our paramount duty—are ready, are desirous to stand upon the facts, as bases both for action and for argument, once the truth is irrefutably made clear. It is because we have not done these things that we have exposed ourselves to the charge of offering as evidence only a multitude of individual opinions—which, however well founded, may be matched interminably by an equal number on the other side.

Let us summarize. We must analyze our pupils into (a) those who can not profit at all by our work, (b) those who will derive from it only linguistic and intellectual habits which can find some advantageous application in other fields, (c) those who will develop from our studies emotional attitudes and bases for judgments which will modify importantly their characters and conduct. And we must treat each class accordingly. The items of information which we impart we must analyze (a) with reference to direct practical value, (b) with reference to the part they play in developing useful linguistic and intellectual habits, (c) with reference to their essential contribution to character-formation. The linguistic and intellectual habits which we find as a fruit of our studies we must analyze (a) with reference to the manner in which they are built up, (b) with reference to the degree to which they may be transferred to other fields of activity. The elements of character which seem to grow out of these studies we must analyze (a) with reference to their sources, (b) with reference to their value in actual current life. Finally, in the light of these analyses we must make a careful survey of the content and methods of our courses to discover for each item the ratio of ultimate value to time consumed for the particular pupils with whom we are dealing.

This paper will come to an end by presenting a paradox which will interest the etymologist. Formalism in teaching, such as the Ciceronianism of the sixteenth century—an omnipresent peril by which education is threatened at all times and in all places—is devotion utterly to the specific habits or items of information and disregard of all the higher categories. Formal discipline is a doctrine which is said by its opponents to have regard only for the higher categories, 'generalized habits', without consideration of the specific elements in which they have their origin.

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⁹Psychology of High-School Subjects, 221.